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RESEARCH

**De-Europanisation after Brexit:  
narrowing and shallowing<sup>1</sup>**

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Europeanisation, for obvious reasons, has often been discussed in tandem with transnationalisation. It is therefore relevant to ask whether de-Europeanisation entails de-transnationalisation, or what elements of the transnational might persist outside the EU framework. I address this issue in relation to the UK and also to Switzerland, whose links with the EU are also under pressure.

**Key words** Europeanisation • UK • EU • Brexit • constitutionalisation

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One of the many misleading slogans repeated by the Brexiteers is that the UK is ‘leaving the European Union but not leaving Europe’. This is true in a geographical sense but occludes the prospect of the radical breaking of a whole set of practical and ideational ties with the rest of Europe.<sup>2</sup> It should be remembered that Theresa May’s initial animus, while she was Home Secretary, was against the European Human Rights regime rather than the EU, and a shadow hangs over the UK’s adherence to this and other institutions which it helped to create in the post-war years. The claim is made that the UK could sustain a respectable human rights regime without reference to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), just as it could run an economy with EU standards of product safety, consumer protection and so on without reference to the EU, but there is a similar failure to recognise the difference between collectively agreed and administered arrangements/understandings and those which, like Stalinist parliaments, merely simulated them.<sup>3</sup>

The most chilling scenario was one in which the UK used its freedom to create an offshore economy with unilateral free trade and a reliance primarily on financial services. If this scenario seems unrealistic, it is worth remembering that it was used as a threat in the event of the UK’s failure to reach an agreement with the EU by Philip Hammond – the economics minister in May’s cabinet – usually seen as one of the saner members of the UK government. With wages plummeting, agriculture

ceasing to exist on the territory of the UK and massive unemployment, the surplus population would have to be managed by increasingly authoritarian means, perhaps dressed up as a British version of national socialism. Something like this scenario still seems to be on the agenda of the illegally funded Conservative 'Europe Research Group'.<sup>4</sup> It is of course possible to conceive a cosier Brexit scenario of egalitarianism, superlative welfare provision and social tolerance, of the kind that would appeal to Jeremy Corbyn and perhaps to a majority of the electorate. There is however no prospect of this being economically viable in a UK/England isolated from the global economy. The UK missed its chance of becoming something like Norway in the later 20th century when North Sea oil opened a window of opportunity. It opted instead for Thatcherism.

Since my argument in this article is largely critical of the role played in the EU by the UK and, to some extent, other member states, it is appropriate to mention here an alternative analysis which would argue that it is in fact the EU that threatens national democracy and is substantially responsible for the current upsurge of populist politics in Europe. This line of argument carries particular weight in a state like the UK, which lacks a written constitution and is often described as an 'elective dictatorship' with few restraints on the powers of the Parliament (which in practice means the executive). (It can also of course be argued that this makes EU membership particularly valuable for a state like the UK.) Arguments framed in terms of sovereignty and (national) democracy have, however, a wider application and have been presumed, for example, by the German Constitutional Court in its 'Solange II' judgement of 1987 that 'so long as the European Communities ... generally ensure an effective protection of fundamental rights ... the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation'.<sup>5</sup> The case for taking sovereignty seriously has been well made by Stefan Auer (2017) in his contribution to a volume I edited on Brexit (Outhwaite, 2017; see also, on sovereignty in relation to Article 50, Dixon, 2018).

The rather tiresome and self-congratulatory discussion of 'European values' in much of the literature suggests that it is important to avoid an over-normative conception of what is European or anti-European, as in the parallel conception of the '(un)-American', overlain with the shadow of Senator McCarthy (Kuhn, 2011; Delhey et al, 2014). If capital punishment, for example, is un-European, I would prefer to say that this is because it is excluded by the legal-political institutions of European states rather than because it conflicts with some nebulous set of values, even if that was the basis of the original political decision to forbid it. Europeanisation, as it was rather problematically applied to post-communist Europe (what else, if not European, were they before?), was however understood, for good reasons, to mean not just the *acquis communautaire* and related practices but a whole range of norms and practical understandings expected to prevail in the processes of transition and accession.<sup>6</sup> How far this went has often been questioned: in politics, in particular, the Leninist conception of 'kto kovo' (who screws who) often persisted or was revived, as currently in Poland and Hungary.<sup>7</sup> The Union's inability or unwillingness to back its principles by legal means, in a complicated situation of a gradual step-by-step move towards authoritarianism ('salami tactics') by ruling parties, makes clear that Article 7 is not

a guarantee of good practice (Ágh, 2017).<sup>8</sup> Outside the framework of the EU and the ECHR, however, all bets are off, with the UN having much more egregious behaviour to concern itself with on a world scale.

Europeanisation often refers, among other things, to the interaction of national institutions with European ones (vertical) or with equivalent institutions in other national states in a European context (horizontal). Vertical integration would include, for example, national ministers in the Council, national civil servants participating in policy making in the Commission and the other institutions, and judges and advocates-general (and their staff) in the Court. There are more ad-hoc arrangements for the interaction of parliamentarians, though for a long time it was common in some countries for politicians to be members of the European Parliament (EP) as well as their national parliaments (and sometimes mayors as well). There are of course formal arrangements for local scrutiny of legislation and other EU matters, such as the House of Lords Committees in the UK. Similarly, in the early years it was quite common for national courts to refer questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but as its case law has developed and become better known this became less common.

Leaving the EU means breaking off all these vertical links and removes access to the structures that mediate horizontal interaction. For a 'third country' with no prospect of accession, dealings with the EU are basically a matter of foreign ministries. It is of course possible that in some areas the practice of a post-Brexit UK would converge with that of the EU, as with, for example, the convergence of foreign and diplomatic services across Europe analysed (though of course in an EU frame) by Brian Hocking and David Spence (2005), but there would no longer be any expectation of this. The only exception would be what is explicitly prescribed for trade arrangements and possibly others to do with security.

Europeanisation, for obvious reasons, has often been discussed in tandem with transnationalisation.<sup>9</sup> It is therefore relevant to ask whether de-Europeanisation entails de-transnationalisation, or what elements of the transnational persist outside the EU framework. First, it may be useful to distinguish between soft and hard de-Europeanisation in relation to the EU. What I mean by the first is a process in which a member state diverges from the general European pattern, either through some agreed process of derogation, which may of course be justified as a way of improving flexibility and diversity (Chalmers et al, 2016: especially 6–7), or through the gradual and possibly surreptitious unilateral abandonment of common European norms, practices or understandings. In the second case, a decision is taken to withdraw entirely from the EU or to abandon the path of accession. Examples of the first would be the UK's emergency withdrawal in 1992 from the European Monetary System in an earlier collapse of the pound, or the gradual erosion of constitutional rule in Poland and Hungary in the middle of the present decade. Examples of the second case are the UK and Turkey – both accompanied (to different degrees) with a shift towards state authoritarianism and increasingly shrill propaganda, some of it directed against the judiciary and academic and other institutions.<sup>10</sup>

The Nordic and Swiss cases are particularly interesting in this connection (see Nielsen, 2018). Greenland, like the UK, voted to *leave* what is now the EU, having a decade earlier voted not to join but been dragged in through its union with Denmark.

It remains closely associated with the EU as an overseas territory, as its union with Denmark becomes ‘ever looser’ (Gad; 2017 {Not in References})<sup>11</sup> Greenland’s rejection of EU membership was substantially driven by the desire to control its fishing, but this inevitably intersected with questions of sovereignty and national identity, the latter defined in opposition to distant Denmark. Greenland’s small population of just over 56,000 makes it a special case, but it is also one of four post-Danish nations, along with the Faroes (also an autonomous region of Denmark), Norway and Iceland, which became independent in 1905 and 1944 respectively (Neumann, 2014; Jonsdottir, 2013). These longstanding concerns were already present in discussion of EFTA membership in 1970 and continued in relation to the European Economic Area (Thorhallsson 2015: 119 {Not in References}). Iceland’s application for EU membership in 2009, after the collapse of its banks, was paused in 2013 and for the moment seems like a blip in an otherwise limited and transactional relationship.

Norway’s membership applications in 1972 and again in 1994 confronted vigorous opposition movements, echoing much earlier opposition to Scandinavianist projects.<sup>12</sup> Accounts of the 1972 referendum, such as the brilliant one by Iver Neumann (2002), could be easily read over into 2016 in the UK, with half-hearted support for membership confronting a diffuse combination of anticapitalist egalitarianism and nativism (Pharo 1993: 255–256 {Not in References}). Lene Hansen (2002: 22) {Not in References} notes that in both Norway and Denmark, it was argued that “‘objective’ economic analysis should be considered part of an attempt to intimidate the voters’ – again prefiguring the Brexit campaign. With Norway’s membership of the EEA, however, ‘Some claim that the Norwegian “No” campaigners won in 1994 but have lost a little every day since then’ (Eriksen 2015: 77 {Not in References}).<sup>13</sup> Lene Hansen (2002: 21) {Not in References} suggests, however, that ‘The biggest difference in terms of the populations’ view of the EU runs ... not between Norway and the rest of the Nordics, but between Finland on the one hand and the “reluctant three” on the other.’<sup>14</sup> This suggests a possible future in which Finland continues to Europeanise, while Norway weakens its links with the EU and, in the middle, Denmark and Sweden resist further integration (assuming this takes place). Here the euro is likely to be the central concern, with Sweden committed in theory to adopt it sometime or other and Denmark having an indefinite opt-out but currently pegging its krone to the euro.<sup>15</sup>

Switzerland has a longer history as an independent state. The diversity of this small country partly explains its reticence about joining the EEA in 1992, when the French-speaking part of the country voted in favour and the German and Italian regions against. The EU has been ‘the most divisive issue in Switzerland and has helped to polarize and ideologize the Swiss party system in a way which has not happened in Norway’ (Church 2007: 2 {Not in References}).<sup>16</sup> The result of the Swiss EEA referendum suggests the emergence of a familiar ‘Inglehartian’ polarisation between openness and tradition, with the yes campaign stressing on the one hand the ‘cultural’ issues to do with avoiding isolation and opening up to the new Europe, and on the other the economic advantages of the EEA. These arguments were reversed by those opposing membership. Fifteen years later, Lachat and Kriesi (2007) {Not in References} traced the broader pattern across Western European politics of ‘the transformation of the cultural dimension’. In the UK, as in Switzerland, free movement has become a sticking point, though neither country

can do without very substantial migration flows, whatever the preferences of their more xenophobic citizens.<sup>17</sup>

Non-membership in the Norwegian and Swiss cases does not in any case mean the absence of transnational regulation (Lavenex, 2011). For the rest of the world, or most of it, outside the Union, WTO regulations form another structure regulating the actions of national states. Although formally the WTO is intergovernmental, in practice it can better be understood as a weak form of transnationalism. The WTO has currently 164 members and an outer circle of observers; only Turkmenistan and North Korea remain outside. The world human rights regime centred on the United Nations is another external sphere, though only the European Court of Human Rights deals with actions brought by individuals as well as states. An important part of the background is what Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997: 192) called the ‘nationalization of international law’, in which ‘Transgovernmental networks allow governments to benefit from the flexibility and decentralization of nonstate actors’ (p 195).

The Brexit fantasy of independence is, then, just that, even in the extreme scenario of a ‘hard Brexit’ with no agreed arrangements with the EU. In the European case, of course, nationalisation tends to mean ‘spill-back’ from Europe to member states. It is important not to fetishise the ‘community method’ and mistrust under all circumstances more intergovernmental approaches such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), or to assume that a European policy will in all cases be superior to one independently introduced by member (or for that matter non-member) states. On the other hand, there are dangers in being too flexible. As Paul Cardwell (2018: 73) has argued in relation to migration, in a context of innovative and perhaps expedient approaches under the heading of ‘new governance’, which allow greater discretion in implementation, ‘there is a real risk that the values the EU upholds are undermined, in turn losing credibility both with populations in the member states, international organisations and third countries.’

A brake on Europeanisation or an experiment with de-Europeanisation in this modest sense would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. I shall concentrate here on more broadly-based proposals for what has been called ‘de-constitutionalisation’ of the EU. The term de-constitutionalisation was used in a rather different sense by Barrus et al (2004), but its present use can be traced back to Ralf Dahrendorf’s ‘Reflections on the Revolution in Europe’, in which he warned post-communist societies against constitutionalising issues of, for example, economic management which should be discussed in a more open framework (Dahrendorf, 1990: 32) {Not in References – 1973?}. Dahrendorf wanted a constitution for what in 1973 he was already calling a ‘European Union’, but ‘a constitution for democrats’ (Dahrendorf, 1973: 209–234). João Carlos Espada (2014) picked up the Dahrendorfian theme, and the Madisonian one which inspired Barrus et al (2004), to address what he called ‘The Missing Debate’ around the speed and direction of European integration.<sup>18</sup>

The constitutional identity of the EU was demonstrated by Joseph Weiler (1999) in the late 1990s and in a major book edited by Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006) {Not in References}. Dieter Grimm, in essays reprinted in Grimm (2016), repeatedly criticised the constitutionalisation of economic policy in the EU and the difficulty of mobilising resistance to it among member states. While not opposed in principle to constitutionalisation and even to a federal EU, he insists that the Treaties

should be limited to setting an institutional framework, with policy issues dealt with in secondary law (Grimm, 2016: 45).

Hauke Brunkhorst (2013) also addressed ‘the fatal simultaneity of constitutionalization and deconstitutionalization of the union’, a theme that he has pursued in subsequent work. Most recently, Fritz Scharpf (2017: 334), who had earlier coined the term ‘joint decision trap’ (*Verflechtungsfalle*), has argued that de-constitutionalisation is the key to the further democratisation of multilevel governance in the EU and ‘loosening the stranglehold of constitutionalised neoliberalism’. In practical terms, he restates his earlier suggestion (Scharpf, 1999) of regularising the approval of opt-outs for states that do not wish to participate in common policies, by majority votes in the Parliament and Council. This otherwise attractive proposal confronts an obstacle in the form of what Michael Zürn (2017: 280) has termed a ‘democratic paradox’ in which people trust independent bodies such as constitutional courts more than parliaments:

while participatory democracy requires a constitutionalized system of rule in which especially the coordination of governance and the delegation of authorities is democratically controlled, the people who, in principle, are in favor of democracy trust especially non-majoritarian institutions that are beyond the reach of majoritarian institutions.

In the background is the factual diversity of the EU itself: not in the sense of a happy interplay of linguistic and cultural differences but in persisting inequalities and polarisations that make a mockery of its cohesion policies. Magone et al (2016) point out in their concluding chapter that ‘In the EU of six, the only serious core-periphery divide was the north-south divide within Italy.’ This is perhaps an overstatement, since many if not all of the original six had much less extreme forms of internal differentiation (though in Belgium and West Germany the regional relations of inequality were becoming reversed). The underlying point is however that the EU today remains unequal and divided in ways that ~~were pointed up {unsure what’s meant by this — already in existence?}~~ and massively exacerbated by the 2008 economic crisis.<sup>19</sup> There are many dimensions to this imperfect Europeanisation, but two are fundamental. The euro, which was intended inter alia to unite the peoples of Europe and in some ways has done so, also sharpened economic divisions, while over-optimistic expectations for the further democratisation of the former communist states were dashed by more and more instances of ‘backsliding’, to which the Union has often turned a blind eye.

This reality is too complex to be squeezed into a have/have-not or core/periphery model, and even Magone et al (2016: Conclusion) stress that ‘The character of the core-periphery divide in the Union is multi-layered and multi-faceted.’ It remains the case, however, that on the whole the North-West is economically and politically in a reasonable state, while the South and East are more problematic. This picture has of course to be qualified with the Irish blip, the UK catastrophe and a certain shadow over Austria and France’s future, and also with impressive performance in pockets of the South and East.



I turn now to discuss in more detail two concepts related to de-Europeanisation: ‘dis-integration’ (using the hyphen to indicate the reverse or reversing of integration rather than something more catastrophic) and ‘differentiated integration’. Hans Vollaard (2018: 123), who has been one of the few people, along with Ben Rosamond, to address the issue of dis-integration, very creatively runs the Rokkan–Bartolini model of state and EU formation in reverse, focusing in particular on the EU’s inability to hold its member states in check and the way in which, so far as it does manage this, it destabilises those states and stirs up resistance to the point of demands for exit in the political fringes or, in the UK, the mainstream right. Thus ‘the same factor can be both conducive to integration and disintegration’. He stresses, however, that dis-integration does not necessarily mean reversion to independent national states (as the UK belatedly realised in 2016–18) and there is a variety of partial exit options (p 150).<sup>20</sup>

Opt-outs are one of the weakest forms of de-Europeanisation or, better, multiple-mode Europeanisation or ‘differentiated integration’, a term that has been in use on and off since the 1980s and was foreshadowed in the Tindemans Report of 1974 (Stubb, 1996; Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012; Leuffen et al, 2013; Winzen and Schimmelfennig, 2016). The relevant aspects here are not the temporal delays intentionally built into eurozone membership or free movement but opt-outs from common policies and the more dramatic prospect, favoured by many German commentators, of a semi-permanent division between a more integrated core and a less integrated periphery or set of peripheries. As John Erik Fossum (2015: 800) has pointed out, it would be better to speak of *differentiation* in cases where the intention is to avoid for the foreseeable future measures adopted by other member states.

The most prominent examples of opt-outs are perhaps Denmark and the UK, unless one includes the states that have rejected EU membership but arranged association through the EEA or related arrangements (Outhwaite, 2018). Briefly, opt-outs seem to have worked reasonably well in Denmark but led in the UK to a drift into the Brexit catastrophe.<sup>21</sup> It does not help, of course, that two of the most salient common policies, monetary union and Schengen, have turned out to be particularly contentious. Whatever one’s view of opt-outs (and mine is shaped by the disastrous outcome in the UK; see also Brunkhorst, 2018), Scharpf is surely right that an agreed common policy in relation to them would be preferable to the ad-hoc arrangements that have been seen so far, and that are to some extent constitutionalised in the OMC.<sup>22</sup> Tanja Börzel (2018: 478), attempting to counter over-pessimistic diagnoses of the future of the EU, argues that ‘differentiated integration should not be equated with disintegration’.<sup>23</sup>

This discussion followed something of a trend in the previous few years. Jan Zielonka (2014) asked ‘Is the EU doomed?’, suggesting that it might ‘muddle through’ in a mixed or ‘polyphonious’ series of uneven developments (see also Zielonka, 2017). Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs (2016: 43) **{Not in References}** suggested plausibly that the more the EU integrated what they called ‘core state powers’ such as ‘money and fiscal affairs, defence and foreign policy, migration, citizenship and internal security’, the more it intruded on the domain of state elites rather than the business elites affected by market integration.<sup>24</sup> While the **latter** tended to welcome integration (as seen more recently in their response to the prospect of Brexit), the **latter** ~~**{former? i.e. state elites}**~~ tend to see the expansion of EU capacities as a threat to their domain of activity, in a logic described over a century ago by Otto Hintze and

Max Weber, who stressed the corporate interest of state elites as a determinant of state policy. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2016: 55) **{Not in References}** conclude: 'Perhaps ironically, the more involved the EU is in the exercise of core state powers, the less it looks like a state: more integration, less federation!'

Both Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation may be seen to destabilise the existing constitutional arrangements of member states. Europeanisation offers opportunities for subnational entities to engage directly with transnational structures, bypassing or acting alongside their national governments. Macro-regional planning, for example, has been perceived as a threat by several states in the Danube region, which has seen attempts to reassert national control (Ágh 2016; Sielker 2017). De-Europeanisation, as in the prospective British case, has also raised issues about where the powers over, for example, agriculture, currently located at the EU level, should end up after the UK's **eventual (hopefully in the continental sense rather than the English one {unsure what this means})** secession. At present much agricultural policy is devolved by the UK to the regional governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This may seem a purely UK problem but the British case has, here as elsewhere, a much more general significance, demonstrating the insuperable obstacles to disentangling the links formed by membership, even for a state outside the eurozone and the Schengen area (Wiener 2017) **{Not in References}**. Although it has not, or not yet, given a decisive impetus to Scottish independence, it has put the UK's devolution arrangements under serious strain, and would probably have done so even without the spectacularly insensitive postures adopted by the Brexit government. It has also threatened to marginalise the UK Parliament and its judiciary – in the latter case throwing up possible parallels with the situations in Poland and Hungary. The UK remains politically polarised on the issue in roughly equal proportions, resembling those in Poland, the US or Turkey.

All this means that de-Europeanisation à l'anglaise is likely to remain a negative example for other member states, as Vollaard (2014) anticipated. A more likely outcome is a further extension of policies that do not directly challenge the EU but attempt to evade or dilute its arrangements (Zhelyazkova, 2014). There are perhaps parallels with Colin Crouch's conception of postdemocracy, in which democracy is not replaced in a Nazi-style seizure of power (*Machtergreifung*) but is undermined in more surreptitious ways (Ágh, 2015). The kinds of accommodations and policy bargains discussed in the context of Europeanisation<sup>25</sup> may also be relevant in relation to de-Europeanisation. Strategies of this kind on the part of member states would complement a drift of the EU itself away from transnational approaches in a further development of the OMC and the 'executive federalism' to which Habermas drew attention earlier in this decade. As Attila Ágh (2017) has pointed out, the EU has also tended to focus increasingly on its own core, ignoring the fragmentation of its periphery.<sup>26</sup>

Whether this softening is a permanent change of course for the European polity or merely part of the back-and-forth movement that it has always displayed, and which is a regular feature even of more consolidated federal systems, remains to be seen (see Kelemen, 2007; Bednar, 2009). Survey evidence suggests that European opinion tends to favour a more flexible and selective approach in which a *less* transnational EU, with *more* popular input through referendums, focuses mainly on peace and security issues as well as the promotion of economic growth rather than energy security or climate change<sup>27</sup> (de Vries, 2018: 190–193). de Vries differentiates usefully between



four attitudes to the EU: loyalists, regime sceptics, policy sceptics and exit sceptics, and also between those in states with relatively good or poor economic conditions. (See also Otjes and Katsanidou, 2017.) There seems to be no support for the most dramatic form of narrowing: the return to a much smaller Europe of six or fifteen. Overall, however, it is hard to disagree with Philippe Huberdeau's (2017) conclusion that European integration is not irreversible.

The central issue will probably be the future development of the eurozone, which is widely agreed to require tighter coordination.<sup>28</sup> In one scenario, then, this drives the EU as a whole (along with a couple of Nordic refuseniks and some laggards) in a more federal direction along the lines argued for by Anthony Giddens (2013) – whether or not this is particularly welcome to European publics. Alternatively, the eurozone, if it survives, might constitute a permanent core of the Union, with a much larger and more fragmented outer circle. This second scenario might come to be seen as a realistic accommodation to political necessity, in a context increasingly dominated by nationalism and xenophobia, or as a seriously damaging de-Europeanisation. European integration began at a time when this kind of nationalist politics had just wrecked the continent, and we have to confront the possibility that it may succumb to it again. As Gerard Delanty (2019: 426–427) **{Not in References}** writes in the conclusion to the new edition of his *Formations of European Modernity*,

To defend Europe in this climate of uncertainty is to defend the social against the destructive forces of globalization and the dismantling of the institutions and structures of political community and solidarity that have been an integral part of European modernity.

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### **Conflict of interest**

**Please supply conflict of interest statement**

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### **Notes**

<sup>1</sup> This title is a reference to the EU slogan of widening (enlargement) and deepening (integration). The current explosion of populism and political polarisation creates particular problems for the EU, which is largely based on argumentation, consensus and compromise.

<sup>2</sup> On the difference between the emergent polity of the EU and other forms of international cooperation, see for example Lavdas (2010).

- 3 For a recent expert assessment, see Rogers (2018). Government statements later became a little more conciliatory (or resigned) on the issue of EU standards. On Europeanisation and human rights, see Schuldt (2018).
- 4 [www.opendemocracy.net/uk/adam-ramsay/tory-ministers-taxpayer-cash-hard-Brexit-erg](http://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/adam-ramsay/tory-ministers-taxpayer-cash-hard-Brexit-erg). More recently a police spokesman has admitted that ‘political sensitivities’ are delaying its investigation of criminality in the Leave campaign: [www.opendemocracy.net/uk/brexitinc/james-cusick-adam-ramsay/met-police-stall-brexit-campaign-investigations-claiming-polit](http://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/brexitinc/james-cusick-adam-ramsay/met-police-stall-brexit-campaign-investigations-claiming-polit)
- 5 This was in fact a revision of the more negative judgement of 1974 known as Solange I.
- 6 As Ernst Haas (1970: 611) repeated in his retrospective article, ‘I consider it [Europeanisation] a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional *and attitudinal* terms’ (my emphasis). For a useful overview, see Anders et al (2016).
- 7 Jan Grzymiski has pointed out that the veteran public intellectual Jadwiga Staniszkis coined the term ‘anti-communist bolshevism’ with regard to the Law and Justice government in Poland; see <https://discoversociety.org/2016/06/01/poland-en-route-to-authoritarianism/>. On the details of the Polish situation, see also Sanders and von Danwitz (2018). See also the related analysis, based on a comparison of Serbia and Bulgaria but of more general relevance, in Dawson 2014.
- 8 In an interesting example of the intersection of two varieties of de-Europeanisation, Ágh (2017: 9) notes that the UK was prominent in blocking the strengthening of the rule of law framework. This was repeated in June 2018 when UK Conservative MEPs voted against sanctioning Hungary. As a member of the civil liberties committee, Sophie in ‘t Veld, commented, ‘Voting with Orbán is the true Tory Brexit: the exit from European values.’ ([www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/25/mep-european-parliament-vote-eu-sanction-hungary-viktor-orban](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/25/mep-european-parliament-vote-eu-sanction-hungary-viktor-orban)). What Ágh (2016a) had earlier described as the ‘Rocky Road of Europeanization’ looks increasingly like a rocky horror show. The analysis by Rupnik and Zielonka (2013) remains relevant; see also Körtvélyesi and Majtényi (2017); Pazderski (2018).
- 9 See for example Bruszt and Holzhacker (2009); Habermas (2017).
- 10 In the UK, a court judgement requiring the government to consult Parliament on its Article 50 notification led to the judges being branded ‘enemies of the people’ in a newspaper article. The government has also been aiming to secure powers to revise legislation without reference to Parliament and to reconfigure the UK’s devolution arrangements. For an excellent discussion of the determinants of the UK’s Brexit negotiating position, see Martill and Steiger (2018). Since, at the time of writing the outcome of the Brexit negotiations is still open and I have been criticised for over-emphasising the ignorance, stupidity and wickedness of the UK government, it is worth stressing the extent of the damage which it has caused to the UK’s image. (In fairness I should admit that this is balanced by expressions of admiration in extreme right circles.)
- 11 See also **Gad 2016 {Not in References}** and **Adler-Nissen and Gad 2013 {Not in References}**. The parallels with Scotland’s reverse situation of being prospectively dragged out of the EU by the UK have been explored in some detail by **Gad {Not in References}**, who has argued that ‘sovereignty games’ may open up options for Scotland short of full independence.
- 12 Like Iceland, its emergence as an independent state is quite recent (1905).
- 13 For a more positive recent official assessment see Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018).

- <sup>14</sup> This contrasts interestingly with last century's joke that in the 21st century, Europe would be made up of the following states: the European Union, the six republics of Yugoslavia, and Finland.
- <sup>15</sup> The euro operates also as a form of weak Europeanisation in those parts of the Western Balkans and Northern Ireland where it circulates as a secondary currency.
- <sup>16</sup> On the other hand, Sieglinde Gstöhl (2002: 214) **{Not in References}** suggests, in her comparison of the three countries, that 'Norway and Switzerland had to cope with much stronger domestic constraints and more issues of national identity than did Sweden.' On 'Alpine' political culture, see Caramani (2005). On Norway as a (probably unattainable) model for the UK, see Fossum and Graver (2018).
- <sup>17</sup> For a Swiss overview, see 'Switzerland and the European Union': [www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/EuropaeischeAngelegenheiten/Schweiz-und-EU\\_en.pdf](http://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/EuropaeischeAngelegenheiten/Schweiz-und-EU_en.pdf). The proposed treaty between Switzerland and the EU now seems dead, since both major parties have come out against it: [www.nzz.ch/schweiz/die-europapolitik-der-schweiz-die-wichtigsten-aspekte-im-ueberblick-ld.1358995](http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/die-europapolitik-der-schweiz-die-wichtigsten-aspekte-im-ueberblick-ld.1358995)
- <sup>18</sup> The EU is not alone in constitutionalising economic policy matters: Article 53 of the Italian constitution decrees that 'the tax system shall be progressive'.
- <sup>19</sup> For useful recent discussions of European inequalities, see the special issue of *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, No. 219, 2017; also Huguée et al (2017).
- <sup>20</sup> On dis-integration, see also Eppler and Scheller (2013); Scheller and Eppler (2014).
- <sup>21</sup> See Vimont (2018). Although the UK may have gained in the short term from opting out of the euro (since its economic management would probably have been no less incompetent than that of Ireland and had similar results) and Schengen (given its island location), these would have bound the population more closely into the EU and made the prospect of leaving it seem more consequential than abandoning an unused credit card or gym membership. Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2015: 13) **{Not in References – there is a 2016 publication}** noted 'the excessively high costs of defecting' from monetary integration; Vollaard's model also stresses this dimension.
- <sup>22</sup> Christopher Lord (2015) pointed to the advantages of differentiation where the resulting negative externalities are relatively insignificant, and Richard Bellamy and Sandra Kröger (2017) defend differentiated integration in a Union of *demoi*.
- <sup>23</sup> On dis-integration, see Schmitter (2012), Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2014) **{Not in References – there is a 2016 publication listed}**, Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016), Rosamond (2017) **{Not in References – 2016?}**. Scharpf (2016), however, calls for the dis-integration of the eurozone, pointing to 'the costs of non-disintegration'. Majone (2014) suggests that integration may have gone too far.
- <sup>24</sup> On citizenship, see Seubert et al (2018).
- <sup>25</sup> See for instance Taylor et al (2013).
- <sup>26</sup> For an argument that the EU should intervene more vigorously in protecting the rule of law in its member states, 'de-fragmenting' itself in the sense used of a computer disk, see Perju (2018).
- <sup>27</sup> It is of course not clear how economic prosperity can be safeguarded without coordinated action on climate change, and the sort of social policy approach which the Union has largely failed to pursue (Walby, 2018).
- <sup>28</sup> See, for instance, Rodrik (2018).

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